knowledge diffusion, while preserving the incentive to invest in knowledge-based assets. 8 Several challenges underscore the need to develop a national strategy for IP protection and enforcement. For example, particular industries are targeted in a wholesale manner for IP theft. Some of these industries are critical to secure growth and competitiveness, and merit additional levels of security . Other technologies are important to preserve military or national security, and likewise merit particularized precautions.' l IP-intensive industries also generate highly paid and skilled jobs.
In 2012, the Department of Commerce and the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office ("USPTO") authored a study to examine the impact of IP on the U.S. economy and job creation." That study found that IPintensive industries contributed directly to 27.1 million jobs and indirectly to an additional 12.9 million jobs in 2010.12 Additionally, IPintensive sectors accounted for approximately $5.06 trillion in value added, or 34.8% of the U.S. gross domestic product. 13 These jobs historically pay relatively well, with average weekly wages of $1156 in 10. Id. at 891 ("Trade secrets also significantly affect national security if they relate to classified information or information pertaining to military technologies."); ONCIX REPORT 2010, which is 42% higher than other non-IP-intensive wages. 4 Another report issued by Congress estimates that U.S. companies have lost between $200 to $250 billion per year and 750,000 jobs to IP theft. 15 IP theft has been linked to organized crime and can pose a danger to consumer safety due to faulty counterfeit products. 6 For example, counterfeit pharmaceuticals are a thriving area of black market trade, and these products may cause personal injury and even death in some cases. 17 For all of these reasons, it is increasingly important for the federal government to develop a comprehensive, coordinated, and effective national strategy for IP protection and enforcement.
Serious efforts have been undertaken by the federal government to address these challenges. These efforts, however, such as the PRO-IP Act, have not been adequately explored in the legal scholarship. 8 This Article will provide an initial critique of the government's efforts to create a national IP enforcement strategy and coordination mechanism, what is labeled in this Article as a national "knowledge police." As will be addressed in Part II, in spite of the government's willingness to expand criminal penalties for all sorts of IP infringement, the proliferation of laws has not adequately deterred illegal conduct.' 9 A key-but often overlooked-aspect of this increasingly complex area of the law is the adequate intergovernmental coordination among the various federal agencies that share overlapping authority necessary to execute a cohesive national IP enforcement strategy. 
See U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, PROGRESS REPORT OF THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE'S TASK FORCE ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 21-22 (2006) [hereinafter DOJ, PROGRESS REPORT], available
at http://www.justice.gov/opa/documents/ipreport61906.pdf.
18. The academic discourse related to the IPEC is hardly existent. One of the few treatments on this subject is Susan Sell, The Global IP Upward Ratchet, Anti-Counterfeiting and Piracy Enforcement Efforts: The State of Play 6-8 (PIJIP Research Paper No. 15, 2010), available at http://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1016&context=research.
19. For example, trade secret criminal prosecutions, although on the rise, remain relatively rare. See Orozco, Economic Espionage Act, supra note 9, at 894-95 (discussing why domestic civil trade secrets infringement suits are more common than criminal trade secret cases).
20. To address this gap in the literature and provide the critique, this Article will examine the complex range of administrative agency interactions designed to implement the growing list of federal criminal IP statutes.2 It is important to critically examine the administrative structure developed to execute these laws because greater administrative complexity, triggered by the expansion of various criminal enforcement statutes, can hinder interagency coordination and stifle the overall aims of policy and legislative reform. 22 This Article will, therefore, discuss the successes, failures, challenges, and opportunities that exist in the federal administration of this increasingly complex area of law, and will examine the collaboration techniques adopted by the various governmental agencies that execute IP protection and enforcement statutes.
A central aspect of this critique will focus on the activities of the Office of the U.S. Intellectual Property Enforcement Coordinator ("IPEC"), referred to as the nation's first "IP Czar. '23 Although widely heralded as an important development in the effort to coordinate and improve IP enforcement, the IP Czar, to date, has proven largely ineffective. As will be discussed, the recent creation of this office through the passage of the PRO-IP Act was considered necessary to achieve clarity and purpose in the government's previously unsuccessful efforts to develop a coordinated national IP strategy or knowledge police. 24 The IPEC has been charged with organizing a national IP enforcement policy, and has undertaken efforts to coordinate resources among federal agencies that are related to the achievement of that objective. 25 The IPEC's efforts to develop a coordinated knowledge police fall short, however, in some important respects. For example, patents play an federal government strives to achieve require the concerted and coordinated efforts of two or more agencies."). patent rights play a vital role in the economy.26 This Article will explore why patents are altogether excluded from a national enforcement strategy, and the implications of this exclusion. Two reasons are advanced to account for this omission, and these are the lack of criminal penalties for patent infringement, and political economy forces acting on the patent system. 7 A consequence of the failure to integrate patents into the national enforcement strategy has resulted in the IPEC's inability to coordinate activities between the International Trade Commission ("ITC") and other federal enforcement agencies. The ITC is an independent IP tribunal that hears patent and other IP cases, and is an increasingly important venue for adjudicating patent disputes with international trade implications.28 Another key deficiency in the IPEC's coordination efforts is its overall lack of strategic planning. For example, a key component of strategic planning is prioritizing resources to achieve well-defined goals. 29 Another component of strategic planning is defining existing strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, and threats, or engaging in what is called a "SWOT" analysis. 30 Despite having the opportunity to do so since its creation in 2008, the IPEC has not engaged in any of these essential strategic planning activities, which hinders its long-term effectiveness as a strategic planning and coordination office. 10-11 (1989) (discussing that the for-profit sector has successfully applied strategic planning, and it may be successfully applied in the government non-profit sector).
30. Id. at 112-13 (describing a strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, and threats ("SWOT") analysis as a "WOTS-UP" analysis).
31. See Part II of this Article will provide a sketch of the federal IP enforcement landscape. 32 Furthermore, Part II will specifically examine all of the federal criminal IP laws, 3 and the various administrative agencies that execute these laws.4 Finally, Part II will assess the issue of interagency coordination, and the role that the IPEC plays as a legislatively designated coordination mechanism. Part III will consider the challenges that have prevented effective coordination in this area of the law. 36 A historical overview is offered that examines the antecedent coordination efforts that predate the IPEC.31 Part IV of this Article will assess the IPEC's coordination structure and strategy. 38 Moreover, Part IV offers a descriptive analysis of the IPEC's institutional structure, 39 and a critique of its current strategic approach. 4 48 Technological advancements also allow parties to infringe on IP rights at a relatively low cost.
4 9 To a considerable degree-notwithstanding significant criticism due to the intangible nature of IP rights -government regulators and policymakers have responded favorably to stakeholders' requests for greater IP protection to promote the goals of job creation, national competitiveness, and consumer safety. 5 Contrary to what is often perceived primarily as a patent-centric technology issue, the call for greater IP rights enforcement extends across a diverse swath of industries. Disparate industries, such as the media, fashion, manufacturing, and merchandising industries, have demanded greater copyright, design, and trademark infringement penalties. 1 Currently, criminal prosecution at the federal level is offered for trade secret, 52 copyright, 53 and trademark infringement. 5 4 Patent infringement is presently the only IP offense that provides civil penalties as the exclusive remedy for infringement. 55 In the absence of substantive criminal patent infringement remedies, there are two relatively minor criminal patent offenses related to false patenting. 56 What follows next is a brief overview of the public laws related to the protection and enforcement of IP rights.57 While the majority of these laws are criminal statutes, a few laws allow a public authority to enjoin unlawful acts through in rem proceedings. because the EEA makes it a crime to "appropriate" or "take" a trade secret without the trade secret owner's authorization. 66 The EEA criminalizes industrial espionage undertaken for the benefit of foreign state actors and the theft of trade secrets committed by domestic or foreign private actors. 67 For individuals, the EEA imposes a fine of up to $5 million and imprisonment for up to fifteen years. 68 The EEA authorizes civil proceedings by the Department of Justice ("DOJ") to enjoin violations of the act, but does not create a private cause of action. 69 Victims of trade secret theft must, therefore, work with the U.S. Attorney's Office to obtain relief under the EEA. Penalties include fines assessed against individuals and organizations, in addition to imprisonment. 
Copyrights
The first criminal copyright law in the United States was introduced in 1897. 7 ' Since then, criminal copyright laws have evolved considerably to cover a broad scope of activities, and have lessened the mens rea requirements necessary to establish liability. For example, the original basis for criminal copyright infringement required willfulness and a profit motive. 72 The Copyright Act of 1976"3 modified the law by substituting the profit requirement for either "commercial advantage" or "private financial gain., 7 4 The No Electronic Theft Act 75 of 1997 went a step further to criminalize copyright infringement by removing the "financial gain" requirement, and making it illegal to reproduce or distribute one or more copies of copyrighted works with a total retail value in excess of $1000. 76 The Digital Millennium Copyright Act 3. Trademarks Trademark infringement was first criminalized by the passage of the Trademark Counterfeiting Act of 1984 ("TCA"). 8 1 This law authorized courts to impose criminal penalties of up to five years of imprisonment and $250,000 in fines on anyone who "intentionally traffics or attempts to traffic in goods or services" that are known to be counterfeit. 8 2 Counterfeiting is the exclusive basis for criminal trademark infringement and enforcement. As defined in the TCA, counterfeiting is the use of a mark "identical with, or substantially indistinguishable from, a mark registered on the principal register in the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office and in use. 83 As interpreted later by the judiciary, the TCA did not extend to counterfeit labels that were not attached to actual products . 84 To overcome this exemption, Congress enacted the Stop Counterfeiting in Manufactured Goods Act ("CMGA") 85 to patents that have relatively little importance. 91 The first law criminalizes the forging of letters patent. 92 The second criminalizes the false marking of patents. 93 Neither of these statues, however, criminalizes behavior that infringes on the substantive elements of U.S. patent rights. As recognized by one scholar, this puts patents "entirely at odds" with other areas of IP. 94 There are some valid reasons, however, for this state of affairs, including the relative social costs and benefits of imposing criminal liability on patent infringement, and strong political economy forces acting on the patent system that deter the imposition of criminal liability. 95 
B. Intellectual Property Enforcement, Prosecution, and Support Agencies
The public IP laws just mentioned are enforced by various federal agencies, which possess overlapping authority . 96 The type of overlap in this area of administrative decision-making is known as "interacting jurisdictional assignments," and occurs when "Congress assigns agencies different primary missions but requires them to cooperate on certain tasks. 97 Scholars have criticized instances whereby administrative agencies possess overlapping authority, because it can generate duplicative efforts, inefficiency, less accountability, and ineffective results. 98 Those undesirable effects occur when administrative agencies possess overlapping authority that generates duplicative redundancy. 99 Some administrative law scholars have questioned whether redundancy is truly an accurate portrayal of what occurs when there is administrative agency overlap.' 00 These scholars instead reframe the issue as a "shared regulatory space." ' coordination efforts succeed in managing the resources and policy objectives underlying the various agencies' activities. 0 2 The end goal of shared regulatory space among disparate administrative agencies is, therefore, effective coordination. Given that there is considerable overlapping authority in the federal enforcement of IP laws, the normative goal of effective coordination becomes essential. The effectiveness of interagency coordination will be assessed below in relation to the "IP Czar," or IPEC, which was created to coordinate efforts of the various agencies involved in the public enforcement of IP laws. 3 Before assessing the IPEC's coordination efforts, the following Subparts will provide an overview of the various federal agencies that share oversight in the enforcement of public IP laws.' 4 These agencies fall within the categories of enforcement, 0 5 prosecution, 1°6 and support agencies.' 0 7
1. Enforcement Agencies U.S. enforcement agencies employ the personnel on the ground who police the terrain in search of criminal activity. A key agency in the IP enforcement area is the Federal Bureau of Investigations ("FBI"), an agency within the DOJ. As a result of funding allocated to the FBI from the 2008 PRO-IP Act, the FBI has greatly increased its activities related to the criminal enforcement of IP infringement.' 8 Currently, the FBI has fifty-one field officers housed within its Cyber Division who investigate IP rights violations.' 0 9 Five of these officers are placed in the Intellectual Property Rights Unit, a multiagency coordination center located within 102. Id. at 1151. Freeman and Rossi assert that:
Yet it is also true that in some cases shared regulatory space could produce substantial advantages, including (1) constructive interagency competition; (2) better expertise in decisionmaking; (3) insurance against any one agency's failure; (4) opportunities for agency compromise; and (5) reduced monitoring costs for political overseers and the public. The first four enhance efficiency and effectiveness, while the last improves accountability. Another consideration is whether, as some commentators have argued, multiple-agency delegations make capture more difficult.
Id.
103. The Immigration and Customs Enforcement ("ICE") agency is an investigative unit within the DHS that targets and investigates a wide range of criminal activities, including shipments of infringing goods attempting to enter the U.S. from other countries. 2° ICE's IP criminal cases primarily involve trademark-and copyright-related offenses. 2 ' In addition to preventing the movement of infringing goods through U.S. ports, ICE aims to "disrupt the manufacturing, distribution, and financing" of the criminal organizations that engage in IP theft. 122 In 2010, ICE "initiated 1,033 intellectual property infringement cases.' 23 Seizures of suspected infringing goods are on the rise. In 2013, customs seized 24,361 shipments, which represented a near seven percent increase compared to 2012.124 The retail value of the seized goods was estimated to be $1.7 billion.
2 5 Sixty-eight percent and twenty-five percent of these seized goods originated from China and Hong Kong, respectively. In February 2010, the U.S. Attorney General announced the development of a new task force on Intellectual Property ("IP Task Force"). 13° The IP Task Force was created to enhance IP protection by strengthening and providing greater focus on domestic enforcement efforts, increasing international engagement, and coordinating efforts with state and local law enforcement partners.1 31 The IP Task Force is chaired by the Deputy Attorney General.132
The ITC has the statutory authority to initiate its own IP investigations and issue exclusion orders, enforced by CBP, that prevent the entry of infringing goods into the United States. 33 In reality, however, all of the IP cases brought before the ITC are initiated by private parties who allege that their IP has been infringed by imported goods. 34 The ITC is an increasingly prominent forum used by private parties to obtain exclusionary orders that can stop infringing shipments from entering the United States.' 35 3. Support Agencies Several other federal agencies are important stakeholders in the public enforcement of federal IP rights. For example, IP enforcement agencies rely on support agencies to obtain data and engage in outreach efforts with constituencies in government, the private sector, and the For example, the PTO's Global IP Academy plays an important role in outreach efforts to limit infringement and complement enforcement efforts by providing training and building public awareness of IP laws. 37 In fiscal year 2012, the PTO's Global IP Academy "provided training to 9,217 foreign [IP] officials from 129 countries."' 3 8 Attendees typically include policy makers, judges, prosecutors, customs officers, and examiners, and training topics covered the entire spectrum of IP rights. 3 9 The ITA is a unit within 
III. THE ROCKY PATH TOWARDS INTER-AGENCY COORDINATION
Despite the rapid expansion of criminal liability in this area, the effective enforcement of criminal IP laws has proven to be difficult. 1 49 It is now clear that stricter penalties are not sufficient to ensure the development of a cohesive and effective national IP enforcement strategy. Experience, instead, suggests that effective administrative coordination is an essential element. The PRO-IP Act was enacted to correct this problem and achieve four broad goals: (1) provide stiffer sentencing; (2) provide additional resources to law enforcement; (3) achieve greater interagency coordination via the IPEC; and (4) develop a national strategy coordinated by the IPEC. 1 5° The creation of the IPEC, however, was not the first time that the federal government sought to promote interagency coordination in this area of the law.
Interagency coordination efforts date back to the late 1990s.' 51 In September 1999, Congress created the National Intellectual Property Law Enforcement Coordination Center ("NIPLECC"). 152 The NIPLECC was a multiagency council or taskforce designed to coordinate IP protection efforts across federal agencies, and its first IP Coordinator was appointed in 2005.' 3 The NIPLECC consisted of the following seven officials: (1) the NIPLECC failed to achieve its purpose, and it was dissolved when the IPEC was subsequently created. According to the Government Accountability Office ("GAO"), the NIPLECC "struggled to define its purpose.' 56 In a 2006 report, the GAO stated that the "NIPLECC had little discernible impact and had not undertaken any independent activities. ' According to the GAO's report, the NIPLECC produced "annual reports that did little more than provide a compilation of individual agency activities." ' 15 8 In light of the NIPLECC's failures, and in response to industry's ongoing call for tougher enforcement, the George H.W. Bush Administration sidestepped the NIPLECC and implemented the Strategy for Targeting Organized Piracy ("STOP") initiative via an executive order.
1 5 9 To achieve its aims, STOP differed from the NIPLECC in the following ways: its leadership was located within the White House's National Security Council; and meetings were scheduled more frequently160 Independent third parties, like the GAO, lauded the President's STOP initiative, though the GAO expressed concerns regarding STOP's status as a national strategy, its tenuous relation to the NIPLECC, and its long term viability. As the GAO stated in its 2006 report: NIPLECC is a coordinating council, while STOP is a strategy involving coordination led by the National Security Council. While NIPLECC has struggled to define its purpose, STOP generated coordination and attention to IP protection from the outset. Congress gave NIPLECC an oversight role, funding, and an IP Coordinator as its head in 2005, but STOP remains prominent. Their functions, however, increasingly overlap. The IP Coordinator regularly conducts STOP activities and speaks for STOP before Congress and private industry. Most significantly, NIPLECC recently adopted STOP as its strategy.
STOP is a good first step toward a comprehensive integrated national strategy to protect and enforce IP rights and has energized protection efforts. GAO found, however, that STOP's potential is limited because it does not fully address the characteristics of an effective national strategy, which GAO believes helps increase the The GAO can be influential in its critique of administrative agencies, and its suggestions for administrative reform are often given notice by top news media outlets and Washington policymakers.1 62 The GAO's frequent criticisms of the NIPLECC and its prescient critique of the absence of, and need for, a national IP rights enforcement policy, may have prompted the legislature to build from STOP and address its deficiencies in its subsequent enactment of the PRO-IP Act. For example, one of the central critiques that the GAO made regarding STOP was that it failed to integrate individual agencies' priorities and objectives in a comprehensive and strategic manner. the executive branch called the IPEC, or the nation's first "IP Czar." ' 169 According to the PRO-IP Act, "[t]he IPEC shall ... facilitate the issuance of policy guidance to departments and agencies on basic issues of policy and interpretation, to the extent necessary to assure the coordination of intellectual property enforcement policy and consistency with other law., 170 According to the GAO, the IPEC was designed to overcome the weaknesses present in prior coordination mechanisms by requiring that the interagency advisory committee prepare a comprehensive joint strategic plan, to be submitted to Congress every three years, that would address key elements of an effective national plan and integrate elements of resource and performance accountability and oversight. 7 1
IV. THE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ENFORCEMENT COORDINATOR COORDINATION STRUCTURE AND STRATEGY: DESCRIPTION AND CRITIQUE

A. Structural Description and Critique
Structurally, the IPEC combines some of the successful attributes of STOP and the NIPLECC, and eliminates some of their shortcomings. For example, as with the NIPLECC and STOP, the IPEC coordinates an interagency advisory committee that is by statute comprised of the Office of Management and Budget ("OMB"); DOJ, including the FBI; USPTO; USTR; Department of State; U.S. Agency for International Development; DHS, including CBP and ICE; Food and Drug Administration; Department of Agriculture; and any other agencies that the "President determines to be substantially involved in . .. combat [ing] counterfeiting and infringement.' 72 Congress also delegated a strategic mission that was previously lacking within the IPEC. The PRO-IP Act now requires the IPEC to prepare three-year strategic plans and report these back to Congress.' 73 The IPEC also draws from STOP because it is situated within the White House, thus increasing its visibility and standing with other administrative agencies.174 Currently, the IPEC is housed within the 169. See supra note 4 and accompanying text. 
§ 8111(b)(3).
173. § 8113(b). 174. GAO 2010 REPORT, supra note 136, at 15 (stating that the "[o]ffice of the IPEC staff noted that because the office is located within OMB, it has had the opportunity to review and shape policy guidance and other policy statements provided by the departments and agencies involved in White House's OMB. 175 The IPEC's location within the OMB is significant as this office has close ties to the President's top advisors and influences policy decisions related to the annual budget. "The OMB has authority to oversee the regulatory activities of federal agencies to ensure that Presidential policies are followed and that economic analysis is [applied] to inform regulatory policy" and rulemaking. 76 The IPEC, like the NIPLECC, is accountable to Congress, and due to its statutory basis, the IPEC has the long-term continuity that was lacking in STOP. 7 7 In many ways, the IPEC represents the best scenario, as it combines the strengths of the NIPLECC and STOP. There are two structural issues, however, that create a challenge for the IPEC's continuing coordination efforts. The first issue is the IPEC's overall lack of authority. As mentioned in the PRO-IP Act, "[t]he IPEC may not control or direct any law enforcement agency, including the Department of Justice, in the exercise of its investigative or prosecutorial authority.' 78 In essence, the IPEC's role is to coordinate agency activities, 79 prepare the joint strategic plan, 8° and recommend actions to the legislative and executive branches.181 This limitation on the IPEC's authority was spearheaded by the DOJ, which did not want the new office of the IPEC to interfere with its independence and authority. 2 The second major structural hurdle facing the IPEC is its relationship with the IPR Center. All of the major agencies involved in IP enforcement efforts have a working relationship with the IPR Center, and the IPR Center is prominently cited as an effective coordination system. 3 Although the IPEC has a broader mandate that goes beyond criminal enforcement, it shares overlapping goals with the IPR Center. The IPR Center, however, frequently overshadows the IPEC's ability to coordinate agencies and promote a strategic agenda. As a result, a scenario exists that is reminiscent of when STOP overshadowed the NIPLECC as a more effective coordination system. 84 These two structural weaknesses should not, however, impede the IPEC from developing a robust strategic plan, as it is mandated to do by the PRO-IP Act.' 85 Producing a comprehensive strategic plan is one of the IPEC's most important mandates, and that plan could be an important document to guide policymaking, discussion, and resource allocations in this important legal area. To date, however, the IPEC has largely failed to provide a robust strategic plan. Thus, it is important to address the particular shortcomings in the IPEC's strategic planning efforts to date.
B. Strategic Description and Critique
The prior Subpart describes the IPEC's unique institutional setting. 86 The presence of various agencies wielding overlapping authority provides a formidable coordination challenge, and various prior attempts have been made to improve coordination. Three additional limitations in the IPEC's approach remain, however, and have not been adequately recognized. 87 The first limitation is the absence of a coordination strategy that reflects the evolving strategic landscape of IP rights enforcement. 88 The second limitation is the absence of strategic resource prioritization to achieve goals that fall in line with a strategic assessment. 89 Third, the patent regime is left out altogether in the IPEC's current national enforcement strategy.' 90 Each limitation will be addressed next.' 91 1. Strategic Assessment Vacuum Overall, the IPEC lacks a strong strategic direction and focus. The main driver of this critique is that the IPEC has largely failed to address and measure the ways that IP enforcement efforts succeed and fall short. 192 Also lacking is an explanation of what is driving these outcomes, and why they are of critical importance to the national enforcement system.' 93 To address this very broad analysis, the IPEC would have to engage in a strategic IP enforcement assessment. One well-known framework for achieving this kind of result is utilizing what is called a strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, and threats ("SWOT") analysis. 194 Currently, the IPEC offers several high level goals that do not reflect a strategic assessment of the current enforcement system's SWOT. The IPEC's goals, which are devoid of any SWOT type of analysis, include: "leading by example;" "transparency and public outreach;" "ensuring efficiency and coordination;" "enforcing our rights abroad;" "securing the supply chain;" and "data driven government."
Engaging in a SWOT analysis is helpful to identify major strategic issues and assess the environment. 96 For example, a SWOT analysis might suggest that a key weakness in the IP enforcement landscape is the lack of a patent enforcement capability, or inadequate coordination with military agencies to prevent IP theft of technologies with national security implications.' 9 7 Opportunities may involve developing publicprivate partnerships within the IP industry, or collaborations with foreign trading partners and world trade organizations to promote the President's national export initiative.
198
Specific threats may be identified, such as cyber warfare and economic espionage, through electronic means. Particular strengths may be identified, such as effective detection techniques at the ports of entry and a robust domestic enforcement framework.
The GAO recognizes that important governmental activities, such as counter-terrorism, should possess the traits of a desirable national 192. 2013 JOINT STRATEGIC PLAN, supra note 25, at 7-9. 193. Id. 194. KOTEEN, supra note 29, at 112-13 (describing a SWOT analysis as a "WOTS-UP" analysis).
195. 2013 JOINT STRATEGIC PLAN, supra note 25, at 13-41. These very broad goals have action items related to them. For example, the action items related to "enforcing our rights abroad" include: "enhance foreign law enforcement cooperation;" "strengthen intellectual property enforcement through international organizations;" "promote enforcement of intellectual property rights through trade policy tools;" "combat foreign-based and foreign-controlled websites that infringe American intellectual property rights;" "protect intellectual property at ICANN;" "support U.S. small and medium-size enterprises [] in foreign markets;" "and examine labor conditions associated with infringing goods." Id. at 25-34.
196. KOTEEN, supra note 29, at 25-26. 197. ONCIX REPORT, supra note 5, at 3. 198. This initiative aims to double exports by the end of 2014 through several means, for example, export financing, investigating unfair trade practices, and promoting trade agreements. strategy. t 99 The GAO states that an effective national strategy should have: a clear purpose, scope, or methodology; a discussion of the problems, risks, and threats the strategy intends to address; the desired goals, objectives, activities, and performance measures; a description of the resources needed to implement the strategy; a clear delineation of organizational roles and responsibilities that includes oversight and coordination; and a description of how the strategy relates to other government units , 200 The IPEC's efforts to promote greater IP enforcement should encompass all of these desirable elements of an effective national strategy. The IPEC is in a unique position to develop a comprehensive national strategy for IP enforcement, because it can aggregate data from various sources and serve as an information clearinghouse.
Prioritizing Activities and Resources
A byproduct of strategic assessment is the process whereby scarce resources are assigned to their highest priority use in areas that generate the greatest results. 1°0 Since the IPEC has failed to implement a high level strategic assessment using a SWOT analysis, it cannot engage in the next important step, which is to suggest how scarce resources should be prioritized to address strategic goals and challenges. 20 2 Instead, the IPEC provides overly broad and general metrics, such as the overall number of enforcement prosecutions and property seizures .203 This level of reporting is similar to that in which the NIPLECC engaged in, and which was the subject of the GAO's criticism that the NIPLECC had simply provided "a compilation of individual agency activities. , 204 The IPEC is currently in the awkward position of failing to prioritize resources when several of the agencies it seeks to coordinate already engage in this vital strategic process. For example, the DOJ prioritizes the IP cases it pursues as follows: "The Department of Justice has historically placed-and should continue to place-the highest priority on the prosecution of intellectual property crimes that are complex and large in scale, and that undermine our economic national security or threaten public health and welfare., 205 The FBI executes this strategic approach since its "[i]nvestigative priorities include theft of trade secrets, counterfeit goods that pose a threat to health and safety and copyright and trademark infringement cases having a national security, organized crime, or significant economic impact. 2°6 Significant benefits could be achieved in the IPEC's overall coordination and congressional reporting efforts if the IPEC were to conduct comparable cohesive strategic assessments and resource prioritizations. Three areas seem to have particular prominent strategic significance. These are infringement activities that pose a threat to health and safety, have a significant impact on the economy, and threaten national security.
3. Lack of a Patent Strategy Currently, federal IP enforcement efforts omit the patent regime, as this is the only area of IP law that remains beyond the scope of federal criminal law.
2°7 Yet, the patent regime is an incredibly important aspect of the national economy. 2 " From a policy perspective, any national IP enforcement system that omits patents will remain incomplete. Also, patent infringement is a growing and pervasive problem, as serious, if not more so, than any of the other IP regimes. The foreign appropriation of patent rights is a serious problem because it often harms domestic innovators who are either deprived of the fruits of their ingenuity abroad, or suffer domestically when products incorporating the infringing technology are imported into the United States.
0 9 Yet, patents are largely absent from the IPEC's discussion involving national IP enforcement.
10
The omission of patents from the IPEC's national enforcement strategy is somewhat paradoxical as the PRO-IP Act, which created the Office of the IPEC, specifically mentions patents GAO to conduct a Study on Protection of Intellectual Property of Manufacturers. 212 As stated in the PRO-IP Act, the GAO's report will examine "the impacts on domestic manufacturers in the United States of current law regarding defending intellectual property, including patent, trademark, and copyright protections." 2 3
A unique opportunity exists for the IPEC to integrate patents into its national enforcement strategy by integrating the ITC into its coordination efforts. The IPEC announced that it will chair an interagency working group to review existing procedures that CBP and the ITC use to evaluate the scope of ITC exclusion orders to ensure that the process and standards utilized during exclusion order enforcement are transparent, effective, and efficient.
21 6 Much more can be done, however, to integrate the ITC and its patent related activities within a national enforcement strategy. The ITC has the authority to launch its own independent investigations under the following statutory language: "The Commission shall investigate any alleged violation of this section on complaint under oath or upon its initiative.
2 1 7 If the ITC finds that a party has violated § 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930, it is empowered to issue in rem exclusionary orders that are enforced by CBP. 218 These orders essentially exclude from entry any goods covered by the scope of the exclusionary order.
219
Given such broad powers, and authority to initiate and adjudicate IP investigations and work with CBP to enforce them at the ports of entry, it is singular that the IPEC would not seek to engage the ITC as a critical ally and partner in its national enforcement strategy. 220 Also, given that the ITC has the power to work with CBP to enforce patent laws, it seems like the ITC would be a natural fit to fill the vacuum currently experienced with respect to national patent law enforcement.
The powerful political economy forces that exclude patent infringement from criminal liability, however, present a formidable barrier to the IPEC's efforts to integrate the ITC into its enforcement strategy. 22 1 Industry group pressure may be countervailed, however, in patent cases involving national security or public health. 222 Integrating the ITC into the IPEC's activities may also require presidential approval via executive order. The Obama Administration has already used executive orders to further IP issues, 22 3 and the language in the PRO-IP Act clearly grants the President the authority to integrate the ITC with the IPEC. The PRO-IP Act specifically states that the President may appoint to the IPEC's interagency committee "[a]ny such other agencies as the President determines to be substantially involved in the efforts of the Federal Government to combat counterfeiting and infringement. 224 Given its mandate to protect domestic industries against foreign sources of counterfeiting and patent infringement, the ITC clearly falls within the IPEC's coordination purview.
V. CONCLUSION
This Article provides an in-depth analysis and critique of the IPEC's efforts to date. 2 5 This is an important subject, since the IPEC has a mandate to serve as an effective interagency coordinator and strategic advisor to the legislature and the President in all areas related to IP enforcement.226 IP enforcement has risen to the highest levels of policymaking and national public discourse. As discussed in this Article, the IPEC has failed to adequately coordinate the various federal agencies that have overlapping authority in this area. 227 The main reasons for this failure are the IPEC's lack of strategic planning, which prevent it from prioritizing resources and activities among agencies, and the inability to integrate patents as a key enforcement issue. 8 Another important issue is the confusion between the roles of the IPEC and the IPR Center, which seems to be, in some cases, a more effective coordination vehicle than the IPEC.229 Policymakers, legislators, and oversight bodies may view these findings as a helpful aid to promote greater accountability and effective management at the IPEC.23°2 
